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Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill?
Marbury and the Construction of the
Constitutional Canon
by KEITH E. WHITTINGTON and AMANDA RINDERLE*
Everybody "knows" that Chief Justice John Marshall and the U.S.
Supreme Court "established" or "created" the power of judicial review in
the case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803.1 The Marbury case is now one of
the foundation stones of Marshall's historical legacy. It stands near the
center of what makes Marshall the great chief justice. As the power of
constitutional review has spread and courts have struggled to win their
independence and gain respect from other political actors, Marbury has
taken on a global stature.2
Marbury's place in the constitutional canon is secure. Scholars at the
turn of the twentieth century heatedly debated whether John Marshall had
used the case to foist judicial review on an unsuspecting nation, or whether
he merely followed the logic of the law and laid bare the constitutional
foundations of the new republic.' The debate was seemingly premised on
the self-evident importance of Marbury itself. There is perhaps no greater
declaration of Marbury's importance than the U.S. Supreme Court's
invocation of the case in the middle of the twentieth century, at the tail end
of the Little Rock desegregation crisis. In responding to the Arkansas
governor and legislature, the unanimous Supreme Court thought it
''necessary only to recall some basic constitutional propositions which are
settled doctrine."4 Quoting Marbury to the effect that "[I]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," the
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics. We thank Bob Clinton, Dick Fallon,
Ken Kersch, Mike Klarman, Martha Minow, Jed Shugerman, Adrian Vermeule, and the
participants in the Harvard Public Law Workshop for helpful comments.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
2. JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 99 (2001).
3. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-80 (1914);
LOUIs B. BOUDIN, 1 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 220-24 (1932).
4. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
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Court added its gloss "that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution."5 This was a contentious reading
of Marbury to be sure, yet scholars at mid-century shared the Court's view
that Marbury was fundamental.6 Civics and history textbooks, including
those written by Supreme Court justices, have followed along, declaring
that Marbury "established" 7 the Court's "role as guardian of the
Constitution."8
Recent revisionist literature on Marbury, however, has challenged that
received wisdom. Revisionists have questioned the importance of Marbury
in establishing judicial review, the originality of its arguments, and the
scope of the power that Marshall was claiming for the Court. Such work
has led the constitutional historian Michael Klarman "to prompt other
scholars to reconsider prevalent assumptions about the importance of
canonical Supreme Court rulings generally and the 'great' Marshall Court
decisions specifically."9
This study contributes to the Marbury revisionism by examining how
and when the case entered the constitutional canon. In particular, this study
takes up Robert Lowry Clinton's influential claim that Marbury was "little
noticed during the first century of our national existence."'o The key
evidence that Clinton marshals for this startling conclusion is data on
citations to Marbury in subsequent U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
Clinton's initial finding helped launch a great deal of the revisionist
literature on Marbury, but the basic empirical claim itself has been taken as
a given and has not been subject to much additional scrutiny, analysis or
extension.'
This Article reconsiders the reception and influence of Marbury by
dramatically expanding the evidentiary base. We reconsider the quantity
and quality of citation data to Marbury in the U.S. Supreme Court. More
importantly, we examine the reception of Marbury in the lower federal
courts and the state supreme courts across American history. Marbury was
quite possibly recognized in nineteenth century legal culture as having
"established" the power of judicial review even if it was rarely cited for
5. Id, at 17-18.
6. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1964); William
W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1 (1969).
7. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 99 (1987).
8. Tom Donnelly, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell
Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 100, 134 (2009).
9. Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions? 87 VA.
L.REV. 1111, 1113 (2001).
10. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 125 (1989).
11. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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that proposition by the U.S. Supreme Court in its own opinions. We
likewise examine references to Marbury in legislative and executive
documents. Finally, we examine the treatment of Marbury in legal treatises
and commentaries in the nineteenth century to gauge both the reception of
the case and the beginning of its transition into the constitutional canon.
Our analysis gives a much more complete picture of when and how
Marbury entered into the constitutional canon and how the case has been
deployed by the courts. Our findings modify the view that Marbury was
"little noticed" by the courts for most of the nineteenth century. The legal
commentary of the period shows that Marbury was not widely regarded as
a special case that "won for the Supreme Court the power to construe the
Constitution with finality ... [and] made the Court's interpretation binding
on all others."l2 More accurate is the phrasing of a recent textbook, which
characterizes Marbury as simply "enunciat[ing] the doctrine of judicial
review."l 3 Nonetheless, a Federalist narrative of a herculean Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury was being laid down in the early republic and
eventually became integrated into a standard narrative of the case. The
rhetorical use of Marbury to bolster the authority of the judiciary as a
constitutional interpreter is a distinctly twentieth century phenomenon and
follows clear patterns of legal and political conflict in the various levels of
American courts. Judging from the use of the case by the courts, one might
well say that it was Brown v. Board of Education4 and its aftermath that
truly brought Marbury into the constitutional canon in its modem form."
Cooper v. Aaron'6 transformed Marbury into the modern symbol of judicial
power, and elevated a different dimension of John Marshall's argument
into the standard judicial and legal rhetoric of the late twentieth century.
Marbury has a particular meaning and significance for us in the early
twenty-first century, and the case occupies an especially prominent place in
the modern constitutional canon. Marbury did not always have the same
resonance that it does today. It took time to convert Marbury into a case
primarily about judicial review; to elevate Marbury above a variety of other
sources from the early republic as the standard citation for the authority of
courts to interpret and enforce constitutional limits; and to suggest that
12. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE
SOCIETY 11 (1968).
13. JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH, & SARA C. BENESH, THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 14 (2005).
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. Stephen M. Griffin, The Age ofMarbury: Judicial Review in a Democracy ofRights, in
ARGUING MA RBURY V. MADISON (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
16. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Marbury was not merely a case in which the Supreme Court exercised or
explained the power of judicial review, but one that somehow created or
established the power of judicial review. As the power of judicial review
became more salient to the constitutional and political system and also
more contested, judges and commentators turned to the powerful rhetoric
of John Marshall to help legitimate the institution to new generations.
Part I of this Article reviews the revisionist case regarding Marbury.
Part II steps back to consider the broader idea of the constitutional canon.
Part III examines citation data on Marbury in the U.S. Supreme Court, the
U.S. circuit courts, and the state supreme courts. Part IV reviews
congressional and executive references to Marbury, and Part V examines
nineteenth century legal commentary on the Marbury case.
I. Marbury Revisionism
There are three aspects to the Marbury revisionism. One aspect
focuses on the content of the opinion itself and the legal and theoretical
meaning of Chief Justice John Marshall's argument in the case. A second
aspect focuses on the originality of Marbury and the extent to which the
case was distinctive in claiming or exercising the power of judicial review.
The third aspect focuses on the reception of Marbury and the extent to
which the case was recognized as significant in its own time. Although
potentially interrelated and mutually reinforcing (it would make sense if an
unoriginal, minimalist decision went largely unnoticed by contemporaries),
they raise separable and independent questions. This Article focuses
particularly on the third issue raised by the revisionist literature, the
question of Marbury's reception and use.
There are various strands to recent debates over this first aspect-that
is, the meaning, scope and presuppositions of Marshall's argument for
judicial review in Marbury. What unites them is the view that the version
of judicial review defended by Marshall in the early nineteenth century
bears little resemblance to the form of judicial review with which we are
now familiar. The very term "judicial review," in the constitutional sense,
is a modern invention and does not appear in nineteenth century debates. 7
But the concept and practice outlined in Marbury may not bear a close
resemblance to the modern institution of judicial review.18 For instance,
some have contended that Marshall's argument only involved the judiciary
in the game of constitutional interpretation, holding in a departmentalist
17. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 28
(2007).
18. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins ofJudicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L.
REv. 1031 (1997).
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fashion that judges could act on their own understanding of the
Constitution but not taking the supremacist step of declaring that the
judiciary's understandings were binding on other political actors.19 Others
have argued that Marshall's understanding of judicial review incorporated a
high level of deference to the decisions of the other branches of
government.2 o Still others have concluded that Marshall's argument did
not extend any further than to cases involving the constitutional powers and
jurisdiction of the Article III courts themselves. 21
The second aspect of the revisionist literature on Marbury is less
dispersed. It simply observes that "Marbury cannot have established the
power of judicial review, since that power already was widely accepted
before the Supreme Court's ruling." 22  A variety of legal and political
precedents for such a power predated the formation of the U.S.
23Constitution. Constitutional framers, congressmen, state legislators, and
essayists had already endorsed the power of courts to monitor the
constitutionality of legislation and to set aside laws when they conflicted
with constitutional requirements. Both state and federal courts had
already begun to exercise the power of judicial review and had provided
justifications for the power in advance of the Marbury decision in 1803.25
State judges had successfully reviewed and struck down state statutory
provisions under state constitutions well before Marbury. Lower federal
court judges had reviewed the constitutionality of state laws as well as
federal laws. The U.S. Supreme Court itself had evaluated the
constitutionality of federal laws and their applications in cases that had
come before it in a handful of cases prior to 1803.26
The third and least developed aspect of the Marbury revisionism
considers the reception and use of the case over time. If Marbury was a
foundational case in creating a power to void legislation, then courts might
19. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial
Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279 (1992).
20. See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
109-112 (1990).
21. See, e.g., CLINTON, supra note 10, at 81-101.
22. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1113-14.
23. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER (2011); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 442-455 (2009).
24. Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789,
38 TULSA L. REV. 609 (2003); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review before John Marshall, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2003).
25. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455
(2005).
26. Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J.
1257 (2009).
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be expected to have taken note of its significance. Robert Lowry Clinton
was perhaps the first to observe that the U.S. Supreme Court rarely cited
Marbury as support for the idea of judicial review in the nineteenth
century. Instead, when cited at all, the case was primarily referenced for its
jurisdictional holdings and implications for the mandamus power. Clinton
contends that from 1803 until well after the Civil War and Reconstruction,
the Supreme Court never cited Marbury as a case about judicial review.
According to Clinton, the first discussion of Marbury in the context of the
power of judicial review in a Supreme Court opinion does not happen until
1887 and is not repeated until 1895.27 Only eight more references are made
before the Little Rock desegregation case in 1958. By contrast, over the
next quarter century fifty Supreme Court cases cite Marbury as support for
the power of judicial review.28 Other scholars have detailed the extent to
which leading lawyers turned to Marbury in public celebrations and
treatises to build legitimacy and support for the exercise of judicial
review-but not until the early twentieth century as the Lochner29 era took
hold.30 For nearly a century, Marbury stood in "relative insignificance as a
decision associated with judicial review." 3 It "became an important
precedent for courts and commentators seeking to justify judicial review,"
32
and thus became a "great case," only in the twentieth century.
Such evidence has helped convince many that Marbury was
"relatively unimportant at first" and that "its ascendance in the American
constitutional law canon came much later . .. after its meaning was recast
in 'mythic' form."33 Marbury's nineteenth century significance may well
has been in its meaning for administrative law rather than in its meaning for
judicial review of legislation.34 The significance of Marbury as a "pivotal
event" in the history of judicial review could be a "classic anachronism,"
with modern commentators reading significance into a case that it did not
possess when it was written. 35 Even critics of Clinton's interpretation of
27. CLINTON, supra note 10, at 120.
28. CLINTON, supra note 10, at 123.
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Use of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a
"Great Case, " 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003).
31. Id. at 386.
32. Id. at 386-87.
33. Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which Convulses A Nation": The Early Republic's
Greatest Debate About Judicial Review Power, 117 HARv. L. REv. 826, 890 (2004).
34. Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law
Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 481, 503 (2004).
35. Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall, the Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis, 1801-
1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 289, 290 (2003).
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the Marbury opinion's meaning have accepted his evidence for its virtual
nonexistence (as a case about judicial review) in the judicial record of the
nineteenth century.
This Article focuses on the evidence for this third strand of the
revisionist literature and reexamines the reception and use of Marbury over
time, which has received far less empirical development despite its
apparent importance to our understanding of Marbury. Doing so has
immediate implications for thinking about the rhetoric of judicial authority
and the process of constructing the constitutional canon. Reflecting on the
empirical evidence of the reception of Marbury over time may also shed
light on just how novel or foundational the case was thought to have been
in the early decades of American constitutional history. We are agnostic in
this Article on the substantive content of the Marbury argument and do not
focus on how the courts and commentators understood the power of
judicial review over time.
II. The Rhetoric of Judicial Authority and
Constitutional Canons
Focusing on the reception and use of Marbury raises the question of
why Supreme Court cases are cited and discussed at all. Marbury is most
narrowly interpreted as holding that the federal courts have the power to
declare acts of Congress unconstitutional and thus null and void. More
broadly, Marbury has come to stand for the general proposition that courts
have the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution and review the
validity of the actions of other branches of government. Either of those
tenets is easy enough to write. Why cite Marbury?
Some scholars have suggested that the transmission of precedents
across courts through citation is a measure of influence. The prestige of the
judge who authored the original opinion is among the factors affecting
whether others will choose to cite that opinion. 37 Others have argued that
the citation of precedent reflects strategic considerations. Judges might
make a "display of authority" precisely when their rulings are likely to be
36. Dean Alfange Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understanding ofJudicial Review:
In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329 (1993).
37. Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme
Courts, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 178 (1985); DAVID F. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2002).
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contested.38 Innovative or legally difficult cases prod judges to bolster their
39
opinions with the support of other prestigious sources.
Quite separately, scholars have become interested in the formation of
the constitutional canon. The legal canon, like the literary canon, is neither
timeless nor natural. The tradition of what cases and materials are regarded
as important about the constitutional past is an invented one, and the timing
of "when certain materials enter and leave the canon" is likely connected
"to political and social issues of the time.AO
Cases enter the constitutional canon and sustain their place there to the
extent that they serve a function for the various audiences for which that
canon has meaning, whether academic, legal, or public. As cases are
canonized, they become less important as legal precedents and more
important as "symbols 'shedding and gathering meaning over time and
altering in form."' 41  The legal and political community may create
"judicial icons" that bear only a limited relationship to the original case but
that serve a symbolic function for those who make use of it.4 2 The process
of canonization, and de-canonization, turns on the substantive
attractiveness and utility of the opinion to contemporary audiences rather
than any intrinsic, original feature of the opinion itself.43
There is no question that Marbury is now part of the constitutional
canon. What remains uncertain is when, and relatedly why, Marbury
became a central case and gained particular importance.44 Marbury is now
the ultimate display of judicial authority. Citations to and quotations taken
from Marbury not only borrow from the ancient authority and prestige of
John Marshall, but also specifically empower the courts vis-i-vis other
government institutions. References to Marbury are part of a rhetorical
strategy for asserting judicial supremacy in the face of political conflict.
The process of canonization has less to do with how novel or persuasive or
influential or important Marbury was in its own context as a statement
about judicial review than on how useful it is to later commentators in
38. Peter Harris, Difficult Cases and the Display ofAuthority, 1 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 209
(1985).
39. David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State
Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 L. & Soc'Y REV. 337 (1997); Robert J. Hume, The Use
ofRhetorical Sources by the US. Supreme Court, 40 L. & SOC'Y REV. 817 (2006).
40. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV.
963, 1008 (1998).
41. Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions ofLaw, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095 (2005).
42. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW (2004).
43. Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998);
KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES (2004).
44. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 40, at 1009.
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building the power of the courts to determine constitutional meaning and
exercise the power of judicial review.
III. Judicial Citations to Marbury
In order to gain a more complete picture of when and how Marbury
entered into the constitutional canon and how the case has been deployed
by the courts, an examination of the quantity and quality of citations to
Marbury is necessary. The sheer quantity of citations to Marbury can serve
as one indicator for when the case became historically important and
entered the constitutional canon. It can also serve to illustrate the way in
which the judiciary has employed Marbury over time. The quality of the
Marbury citations and the degree to which they are used for judicial review
rather than for jurisdictional holdings or for the implications of the
mandamus power can also tell the story of when Marbury was transformed
from a case that made a variety of substantively important holdings about
constitutional law and statutory interpretation to a case that made judicial
review possible.
In the following discussion, we give particular attention to three
distinct time periods where the literature suggests different patterns in the
judiciary's level of citation to and qualitative use of Marbury. The first
time period encompasses the first century after Marbury was handed down.
As noted above, Clinton and others have argued that Marbury was "little
noticed" during this period and that we therefore would expect few
citations to the case.45 Furthermore, we would not expect these citations to
be for the judiciary's authority to exercise a power of judicial review, but
instead for such matters as jurisdiction and the use of the writ of
mandamus. The second time period extends from the centennial
anniversary of Marbury in 1903, which was designed to draw increased
attention to both the case and Chief Justice John Marshall, until Cooper v.
Aaron was handed down in 1958. Marbury revisionists have suggested
that it was the efforts of the conservative bar to celebrate Marbury in the
midst of Lochner era controversies that spurred a transformation in the
historical importance of the case. This change would suggest a rise of
citations and shift in the nature of citations at the turn of the century.
Finally, the third time period runs from the year Cooper v. Aaron was
handed down in 1958 to the present. It is appropriate that the Court's
strong exposition of judicial authority in Cooper v. Aaron marks the
beginning of this period, famously pointing back to Marshall's declaration
in Marbury that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
45. CLINTON, supra note 10, at 125.
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department to say what the law is" while declaring that the Court's
decisions were supreme and binding on the other branches of government.
The Court's powerful declaration of judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron
as well as the judiciary's increasingly frequent exercise of judicial authority
during this time period, might itself be expected to mark a distinct break in
the judicial rhetoric regarding Marbury and judicial review.
In order to study the judiciary's changing tendency to cite Marbury,
we created an original dataset of federal and state cases citing Marbury. A
review of all citations to Marbury offers important advantages over
previous scholarship. Previous analyses have relied heavily on evidence
from the U.S. Supreme Court to draw conclusions about Marbury's
prominence, but the Court is only one source of evidence for juridical
perceptions of the case. Its citation patterns in the nineteenth century,
however, may well have been idiosyncratic (Chief Justice John Marshall
himself often neglected to cite relevant precedents).46 A broader analysis
of the Court's entire history and of the lower federal courts and the state
courts provides a more comprehensive basis for drawing conclusions about
the legal community's reception and use of Marbury, and its significance
as a source of authority in judicial argument. Evidence from state courts
and lower federal courts might be expected to cut against Clinton's
findings. States often needed to initiate and justify judicial review in their
own constitutional systems (and thus might be expected to cite Marbury if
it were thought to be a significant authority for such a power), and lower
federal courts might be expected to cite a prominent, authoritative case of
their own superior court. We can better gauge Marbury's importance over
time by assembling a comprehensive, systematic portrait of when and how
it was used.
The original dataset was constructed using both Westlaw Campus and
Lexis Nexis. A "KeyCite" or "Shepardization" search as well as a keyword
search for "Marbury w/2 Madison" was used to construct a comprehensive
list of citations in the Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and state
courts. All citations, including those in majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions, as well as references by counsel in the case, were
included.
46. Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in
Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wisc. L. REV. 301 (1986); Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall's
Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 439 (1996). The average number of citations in each U.S.
Supreme Court opinion has gradually increased across time, but the average number of
precedents cited from any given year has been fairly constant over the course of the Court's
history. See James H. Fowler, Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II, Sangick Jeon, & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance ofPrecedents at the
U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANAL. 324, 333 (2007).
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Figure 1: Number of Federal and State Cases Citing Marbury v. Madison, 1803-2008. Note:
Centered, five-year moving average. U.S. Supreme Court citations on the right axis.
The first step in the analysis focuses on any case that makes a specific
reference to Marbury v. Madison, regardless of the nature of the case
making the citation. The results are shown in Figure 1 (using a centered,
five-year moving average to smooth the year-to-year fluctuations). The
judicial citation data partly reinforce and partly modify expectations from
the existing literature. As expected, the citation pattern shows a marked
increase in the rate of citation to Marbury in the Supreme Court, circuit
courts, and state courts over time, with the number of citations being
relatively low and sporadic until the twentieth century.
The citation behavior of the state and federal circuit courts reinforce
the evidence from the U.S. Supreme Court and indicate that Marbury took
on a new significance in the twentieth century. From 1803-1901, before
Marbury came to prominence as a judicial review case, citations to
Marbury were relatively infrequent but not rare, with the Supreme Court
citing Marbury an average of only 0.88 times a year while the federal
circuit courts and state courts cited Marbury an average of 0.52 and 4.56
times a year, respectively. During the second time period, from 1903-
1957, the judiciary was slightly more likely to cite Marbury. The Supreme
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Court cited Marbury an average of 1.05 times a year and the federal circuit
courts and states courts cited Marbury on average 1.89 and 7.00 times a
year from 1902 to 1957. These averages obscure a noticeable but short-
lived wave of Marbury citations at the turn of the twentieth century,
especially in the U.S. Supreme Court. The increased salience of Marbury
at the turn of the century is consistent with the current literature, which has
taken note of both the newfound significance of judicial review during the
Lochner era and the self-conscious celebration of the centennial of
Marbury by conservative lawyers.4 7 Such efforts may have helped
transform the perception of Marbury, but their direct influence on the
judiciary was not so enduring, and by the New Deal, citations to Marbury
had dropped to nineteenth-century levels. 4 8
The rate that the judiciary cited Marbury exploded during the third
time period from 1958-2008, with the Supreme Court leading the way and
the state supreme courts and federal circuit courts following after a brief
lag. The average number of citations per year to Marbury during this time
period rose to 3.0 in the Supreme Court, 22.5 in the federal circuit courts,
and 18.98 in the state courts. While the increase was very significant in all
of the courts, it was the most dramatic in the circuit courts. The percent
increase in average citations per year from period 2 to period 3 was 190%
in the Supreme Court, 1091% in the federal circuit courts, and 171% in the
state courts.
If Figure 1 reveals that Marbury became increasingly prominent in the
twentieth century, it also reveals the fact that Marbury was a notable case
in the nineteenth century, as well. Marbury was frequently cited in both
the U.S. Supreme Court and the state courts in the nineteenth century,
though not at the levels it would reach in the twentieth century. Marbury
did not sit in obscurity over the course of the nineteenth century, but rather
made an appearance in dozens of cases. The revisionists too often
underplay the extent to which Marbury was a well-known case in the
nineteenth century. The question that Figure 1 raises is how Marbury was
used by the courts in the nineteenth century and beyond.
As a second step, we supplement the citation analysis with a content
analysis of the cases citing Marbury. Crucial to Clinton's argument is that
47. See CLINTON, supra note 10; Douglas, supra note 30.
48. In a sense, there were more "opportunities" to cite Marbury in later years as the number
of cases and the number of courts increased, but what is of interest here is the salience and utility
of Marbury as part of the constitutional rhetoric. Notably, Marbury citations do not correlate
with the timing of the entry of states into the union and the creation of their own judiciaries.
Likewise, Marbury citations are not correlated with the overall number of signed decisions issued
by the U.S. Supreme Court or the state supreme courts. Total Marbury citations and the caseload
of the federal circuit courts do follow a similar pattern.
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the Supreme Court rarely cited Marbury in the nineteenth century, and that
those few cites did not reference the power of judicial review or use the
case as an authority for the power of judicial review.49 Figures 2 and 3
report the results of a comparable but broader content analysis of cases
citing Marbury.
C\1
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1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Figure 2: Number of Federal and State Cases Citing Marbury v. Madison for the Power of
Judicial Review, 1803-2008. Note: Centered, five-year moving average. U.S. Supreme
Court citations on the right axis. Figure based on a content analysis of decisions citing
Marbury v. Madison. Figure includes all U.S. Supreme Court cases and estimate of state
and circuit court cases based on content analysis of stratified, random sample of Marbury-
citing cases.
49. CLINTON, supra note 10.
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----------- U.S. Supreme Court
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Figure 3: Proportion of Cases Citing Marbury for the Power of Judicial Review by Type of
Court and Time Period. Note: Figure based on a content analysis of decisions citing
Marbury v. Madison. Figure includes all U.S. Supreme Court cases and estimate of state
and circuit court cases based on content analysis of stratified, random sample of Marbury-
citing cases.
In order to understand when Marbury became important for its
judicial review component, we conducted a content analysis of these
citations in the Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and state courts. All
U.S. Supreme Court opinions and a stratified, random sample of state
supreme court and federal circuit court opinions citing Marbury were
coded as providing authority for the power of judicial review or for some
other proposition. In Figure 2, we show the rate at which Marbury was
cited specifically for judicial review in the Supreme Court, federal circuit
courts, and states courts over time.
Figure 2 shows that Marbury was regularly cited as authority for
judicial review in the nineteenth century, but at relatively low levels. This
use of Marbury is easily missed unless the analysis is expanded beyond the
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U.S. Supreme Court. Comparing Figure I with Figure 2 shows a sharp
reduction in the number of cases citing Marbury, but a generally similar
ratio over time of overall citations to judicial review-specific citations.
Figure 2 does show a distinct flattening of judicial review citations in the
nineteenth century compared to Figure 1, however, and highlights the
temporary surge in Marbury citations at the turn of the century not only in
the U.S. Supreme Court but also in the state supreme courts. It also
suggests the significance of the centennial activities and the Lochner-style
controversies in increasing the salience of Marbury as an authority for
judicial review. The justices on the Vinson Court make scattered and
modest use of Marbury, often in dissent, but the turning point in Marbury's
prominence in judicial rhetoric in the postwar period came in Cooper.
Figure 3 further illuminates these relationships. In Figure 3 we show
the percentage of citations to Marbury that refer to it as a precedent for the
power of judicial review, organized by type of court and by time period.
Most notably, Figure 3 reveals what Figure 2 can only suggest-the
proportion of Marbury-citing cases that cite it as an authority for judicial
review, and how that proportion has changed over time. In the Supreme
Court, we found that only 8% of Marbury citations during the first time
period were for judicial review. This doubled to 16% during the second
time period and rose again to 43% during the period after Cooper v. Aaron.
The federal circuit courts followed a broadly similar pattern. They started
from a higher base, with 16% of Marbury citations in the nineteenth
century using the case as support for the power of judicial review, with a
comparable citation pattern in the first half of the twentieth century. In the
post-Cooper period, however, the proportion of judicial review citations
increased to more than a third of all Marbury citations (a statistically
significant difference at the 0.05 level). The pattern in the state courts
borrows from both the circuit courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. The
baseline in the nineteenth century is relatively high, but the proportion of
judicial review citations increases in a stepwise fashion across the twentieth
century. Marhury citations for judicial review made up 15% of citations
during the first time period, 27% during the second time period, and 46%
during the final time period (both differences are statistically significant at
the 0.05 level). A comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 reveals that, though
each type of court does cite Marbury as an authority for judicial review in
the nineteenth century in a non-trivial percentage of its cases citing
Marbury, most of those judicial review references come decades after the
case was handed down, in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
One issue worth considering is the relationship between the exercise
of judicial review and citations to Marbury. As the literature of judicial
displays of authority suggests, judges are more likely to make reference to
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a case like Marbury when the political stakes are high and the legitimacy of
the court's action is likely to be questioned.o We might expect that the
Court will cite Marbury more when it strikes down statutes and is
otherwise at risk of being labeled "activist." More fundamentally, cases
involving questions of the constitutionality of statutes may create
opportunities for the Court to cite Marbury as an authority for the doctrine
of judicial review. If the Court is not exercising the power of judicial
review, there may be little opportunity or reason to cite Marbury. These
relationships are harder to test for the lower federal courts and the state
courts, due to data limitations, so we focus on the U.S. Supreme Court.5 1
As expected, there is a small but positive relationship between citations to
Marbury by the Court and the number of times that the Court strikes down
federal laws in that year (at the 0.05 level).52 Moreover, there is a
substantively small but similarly positive relationship between citations and
total number of cases reviewing federal statutes (at the 0.05 level). These
relationships are not stable across history, however. The correlation
between citations to Marbury and cases striking down federal laws is
strong in the twentieth century, 5 4 but loses statistical significance in the
nineteenth century. 5 A reverse pattern occurs with cases upholding federal
legislation against constitutional challenge. Marbury citations are
correlated with such cases in the nineteenth century,56 but not across the
entire period.57 On the whole, there is not a strong correlation between the
exercise of judicial review and citations to Marbury by the Supreme Court,
and the Court frequently exercises the power of judicial review without
citing Marbury. The presence of cases involving the constitutionality of
statutes on the Court's docket may create opportunities (and incentives) for
the Court to cite Marbury, but the effect is a weak one.
IV. Congressional and Executive References to Marbury
Government officials other than state and federal judges have also
been capable of recognizing the potential significance of Marbury and
50. See supra notes 38, 39.
51. The data on Supreme Court review of federal statutes derives for the Judicial Review of
Congress database. See Whittington, supra note 26, at 1261-66. The period analyzed includes
U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1804-2005.
52. b=0.173, SE=0.04.
53. b=0.039, SE=0.015.
54. b=0.19, SE=0.058.
55. b=0.201, SE=.115.
56. b=0.105, SE=0.046.
57. b=0.024, SE=0.019.
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making use of it to bolster their arguments. Legislators referred to
Marbury in floor debates and committee reports, presidents cited the case
in messages, and attorneys general cited it in official opinions. The
rhetoric of non-judicial actors provides evidence on how the legal and
political communities perceived the case over time, and how they advanced
the process of placing Marbury in the constitutional canon.
In many ways, the evidence from the elected branches reinforces the
judicial citations evidence. Marbury citations were less common in the
nineteenth century and increased dramatically in the twentieth century
outside the courts just as they did inside the courts. Moreover, the
significance of Marbury also shifted over time, with greater attention
towards the relevance of the case to the power of judicial review in the
twentieth century than in the nineteenth. These patterns are relatively
muted in the executive branch, however, which consistently but rarely cited
Marbury over time and primarily in regard to questions relating to
- * 58appointments, removals and commissions.
58. A notable exception is the 1865 opinion by Attorney General James Speed, who cited
Marbury in support of the proposition that unconstitutional laws are void from their origin and
thus "it is equally the duty of the officer holding the executive power of the Government, for the
purposes of his own conduct and action" to determine the constitutionality of a law. 11 Op.
Att'y. Gen. 209, 214 (1865). The departmentalist reading of Marbury also made appearances in
nineteenth century congressional debates, including Senator Bedford Brown's suggestion that
"the opinion of the illustrious Jefferson" that each branch should interpret the Constitution for
itself was "recorded in the case of Marbury vs. Madison." 10 REG. DEBATES 867 (1834).
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Figure 4: Annual Number of References to Marbury in Congressional Debates, 1803-2002.
Figure 4 reports the number of recorded references to Marbury in
congressional debates each year across time. Marbury made an appearance
in congressional debates in the nineteenth century, but references were
sporadic and rare prior to the Civil War. The annualized pattern reveals
that the citation rates in Congress do not progress steadily but are instead
highly responsive to particular events. Political controversies over
executive appointments and removals in the Jackson administration, the
Andrew Johnson presidency, and the late nineteenth century all spurred
legislators to cite the case to bolster their position. By contrast, twentieth
century debates surrounding the New Deal and Court-packing, Brown, the
end of the Warren Court and the beginning of the Reagan administration all
provoked discussions of Marbury and judicial review. For twentieth-
century legislators, as for judges, Marbury had become a standard part of
the discourse when controversies erupted over judicial review, but the case
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had tended to play a different role in the nineteenth century when it had the
greatest salience in debates over appointments and removals. To a
significant degree, Marbury was best known (and well known) in the
nineteenth century as a case about William Marbury and his commission.
Only in the mid-twentieth century did Marbury take on its primary modem
resonance as a case about the Court's power to invalidate a provision of the
Judiciary Act.
V. Early Commentary on Marbury
Judicial citation patterns, as well as evidence from congressional and
executive documents, support the notion that Marbury was known within
the political and legal communities in the nineteenth century but was not
exclusively or even primarily known as a case about judicial review.
Marbury's importance and identity changed over time, however. Marbury
became a more prominent, more frequently cited case in judicial and
political debates in the twentieth century, particularly in the late twentieth
century, and those references increasingly focused on Marbury's relevance
to the power of judicial review.
Although judges may have particular reason to look for authorities to
support their exercises of judicial review, they are not the only
representatives of the legal culture who could recognize or construct the
significance of Marbury. If judges did not cite Marbury on judicial review
to any great degree until well into the twentieth century, it remains to be
determined how the case was substantively discussed. It is through these
substantive discussions that the path of canonization can be traced.
This section reviews a variety of authors who discussed Marbury,
primarily treatise writers but also judges, memorialists, and legislators, in
order to further unpack the meaning of Figures 1 and 2.5 The focus is on
the nineteenth century, for that is where the qualitative transformation in
the understanding of Marbury takes place. It is clear that by the early
twentieth century, Marbury is a much discussed part of the constitutional
canon and is at the heart of debates about the power of judicial review.6 0
The question raised by Clinton and other revisionists is whether Marbury
held this status from the beginning. In order to investigate the revisionist
claims, we should examine how Marbury was discussed and used in the
nineteenth century and when the characterization of Marbury as a case
59. The following discussion builds on a comprehensive survey of cases and commentaries
citing Marbury in the nineteenth century. Particular examples in the text are illustrative of
broader tendencies.
60. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW I (1914); CHARLES
GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 168 (1914).
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about establishment of judicial review began to take on its familiar, modem
form.
Marbury was immediately recognized as a case that was relevant to
the power of judicial review. It was not, however, generally held up as
being a foundational case that uniquely or critically established the power
of judicial review. For many nineteenth century commentators, Marbury
was simply part of the general constitutional landscape. There were early
exceptions such as Joseph Story who did highlight Marbury and John
Marshall's role in empowering the courts,61 and they developed a narrative
that would become commonplace by the end of the century.
There was little contemporaneous reaction to John Marshall's
assertion of the power of judicial review in Marbury. As Supreme Court
historian Charles Warren thoroughly documented, Marbury was a high-
profile case that generated substantial public discussion and controversy. 62
Public comment at the time revolved around other questions raised by the
case, most notably the chief justice's assertion that the courts could monitor
and correct how cabinet members conducted their duties. The near silence
surrounding the discussion of judicial review in Marbury sharply contrasts
with the public notice taken of the power during earlier controversies and
following earlier decisions, including the determination by the federal
circuit courts in the 1790s that provisions of the Invalid Pensions Act was
unconstitutional.
The Marbury opinion had high prestige and salience in the nineteenth
century in the political and administrative law context. As Figure 1
illustrates, Marbury was routinely discussed in the courts in the nineteenth
century, but for the substantive content that is frequently ignored today. It
was in this context that Justice Joseph Story extolled the case in a circuit
court opinion as "the great case of Marbury v. Madison ... great, not only
from the authority which pronounced it, but also from the importance of the
topics which it discussed."6 3 Similarly, when state judges wrote paeans to
the "celebrated case"" of Marbury and talked about it as "one of the ablest
arguments of Chief Justice Marshall," it was not for his establishment of
the power of judicial review but for his substantive defense of the
constitutional jurisdiction of the courts and the prohibition on legislatures
61. JOSEPH STORY, Judiciary - Organization and Powers, in 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 428-33 (1833).
62. CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 245-62
(1926).
63. Johnson v. United States, 13 F. Cas. 868 (D. Me. 1830).
64. G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. R.G. & J.T. Place,, 4 R.I. 324 (1856).
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"imposing on those Courts a succession of new duties."" In 1860,
Republican Representative James Hale sought to deflate judicial prestige
somewhat and so reminded his colleagues of the "famous case" of Marbury
because it represented a great clash between the chief justice and the
president over the mandamus power and the completion of commissions.66
Marbury revisionists have had a tendency to downplay the nineteenth-
century significance of the case, but such casual references by judges and
legislators to the "great case" of Marbury should temper that inclination.
Marbury was memorable for many things, and many nineteenth-century
commentators focused on the politics surrounding the case or the
substantive matters of law discussed in Marshall's opinion when recalling
the case and tracing its lessons. Those traits made it an attractive candidate
for transmission and canonization when interest did eventually turn to
judicial review. 67
As the revisionists would expect, the earliest cases that took note of
Marbury at all as a precedent for judicial review did not tend to give
inordinate attention to it. U.S. District Court judge John Davis, for
example, dealt with Marbury in a two-sentence footnote in his opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the Jeffersonian embargo in United States
v. The William (1808).68 Judge Davis did not seem to think there was any
question to be raised about "the duty of the court" to make a "comparison
of the law with the constitution." But the question of whether the courts
could properly invalidate legislation that did not contradict "express
provisions" of the Constitution was more difficult, and Davis canvassed a
range of authorities to illuminate that issue. He gave sustained attention to
various circuit court and Supreme Court decisions from the 1790s that had
evaluated the constitutionality of state and federal laws. Marbury simply
was in "affirmance of the general doctrine, exhibited in the cases cited in
the text."69 Similarly, the South Carolina Constitutional Court of Appeals
65. Caulfield v. Hudson & Hudson, 3 Cal. 389 (Ca. 1853).
66. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Ist Sess. 762 (1860).
67. The California Supreme Court discussed Marbury and the mandamus power in language
eerily similar to the famous line in Cooper v. Aaron, and suggests that the gap between two sorts
of powers was not vast. "The power of the Courts to interfere in this behalf is resisted on the
ground that the power of the Legislature is political in its character, and cannot be controlled, and
that the duties devolved up the officers are also political, and cannot be interfered with by the
judiciary.... The act of drawing a warrant, or paying money out of the treasury, is, in most cases,
merely ministerial, and in such case the officer is amenable to the Courts and bound by their
orders. This proposition was determined in the case of Marbury v. Madison, by the Supreme
Court of the United States, as early as 1803, and has ever since been regarded as the settled law of
the country." Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65, 80 (1857).
68. United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614 (D. Mass. 1808).
69. Id. at 618.
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included Marbury as part of a string cite along with other state and federal
cases and St. George Tucker's CommentarieS70 in support of the
proposition that each "department of the government, is the constitutional
judge of its own powers; each within its own sphere" and that judges are
bound to "refuse to execute" statutes "contrary to the manifest tenor of the
constitution."n Pennsylvania's court similarly emphasized Tucker's
treatise and Justice Patterson's circuit court opinion in Vanhorne's Lessee
v. Dorrance72 before adding that Marshall's opinion in Marbury
"strengthened and confirmed the sentiments I have ever entertained" (the
defense counsel had noted that the power of judicial review "had been
repeatedly affirmed by judicial decisions" but did not include Marbury in
his list of authorities).
As time passed, both lawyers and judges included Marbury in a
fluctuating list of state and federal cases and extrajudicial materials that
provided authority for the proposition that unconstitutional acts were null
and void. Often, Marbury was simply part of a lengthy string cite as in the
New Hampshire case of Merrill v. Sheburne (1818),74 or the Louisiana case
of Louisiana Ice Co. v. State National Bank (1880).7 Sometimes, Marbury
was named as part of a shorter list of examples of courts exercising the
power of judicial review, or was even allowed to stand on its own, but
unadorned with any description of its particular importance in establishing
judicial review. For example, the Indiana case Dawson v. Shaver (1822)
matter-of-factly cited Emerick and Marbury to support its point that "the
duty of the Court is imperative, and its authority is unquestionable" to
declare unconstitutional statutory provisions null and void. U.S. District
Judge Robert Wells included Marbury along with Vanhorne's Lessee and
the Federalist Papers to lend support for "the principles intended to be
established by the framers of the constitution; and . .. established judicial
principles" when writing one of the few antebellum lower court opinions
declaring a federal law unconstitutional. This was also one of the very few
nineteenth century references to Marbury for the power of judicial review
in a federal court opinion.7 7  Legislators showed a similar tendency
throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century, when they
70. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1803).
71. White v. Kendrick, 1 S.C.L. 469 (1 Brev.) (1805).
72. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795).
73. Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1808).
74. Merrill v. Sheburne, I N.H. 199 (1818).
75. Louisiana Ice Co. v. State Nat'1 Bank, 1 McGI. 181 (La. Ct. App. 1880).
76. Dawson v. Shaver and Another, 1 Blackf. 204 (Ind. 1822).
77. In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 719 (D. Mo. 1843).
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referenced Marbury in relation to judicial review. During the South
Carolina nullification debate, for example, Senator Miles Poindexter
asserted that "[a]ll parties agreed" at the time of the founding that
unconstitutional laws were "absolutely null and void," and he pointed out
that this "principle has often been recognized by judicial decisions, both in
the federal and the State courts." Marbury was simply one of several cases
"on this point."78  During the Reconstruction debates, Senator Reverdy
Johnson leapt to correct the suggestion that there had been doubts at the
time of the founding about the power of judicial review and similarly
emphasized the myriad statements and decisions in support of such a
power. Marshall's careful exposition of the power in Marbury was "for the
purpose, not of satisfying the minds of the court that they had the power to
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, but to satisfy the public mind"
that the justices had done "their duty" while exercising such a power. 79 By
the mid-nineteenth century, however, some judges had already found
Marshall's language to be particularly quotable, and Marbury was cited not
for its importance but for its eloquence. Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court
provides an extended excerpt from the case with the preface, "Chief Justice
Marshall lays down the doctrine in the following clear, pointed and forcible
language."so
Yet there were isolated exceptions in the state courts in the early
nineteenth century that seemed to attribute greater significance to Marbury.
Judge John D. Cook, a short-tenured Whig on the Missouri Supreme Court,
sounded an exceptionally modem note at the conclusion of his opinion in
Baily v. Gentry (1822), writing "[s]ince the case of Marbury v. Madison ...
this question [of the judicial authority to decide "on the validity of the acts
of the Legislature"] has been generally looked upon as settled." 8'
Somewhat more ambiguously, in an early alcohol prohibition case the
Indiana Supreme Court rebutted the suggestion of the state's attorneys that
the safety of the people was the supreme law by observing that there were
constitutional barriers to legislative power that the judiciary was obliged to
enforce, and that "[t]his duty of the judicial department, in this country,
was demonstrated by chief justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison. . . and
has since been recognized as settled American law." 82 This sort of "since
Marbury" rhetoric is familiar to modem ears, especially after Cooper, but
such characterizations of Marbury were uncommon in the early nineteenth
78. 9 REG. DEBATES 630 (1833).
79. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 772 (1868).
80. Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15 (Iowa 1849).
81. Baily v. Gentry and Wife, I Mo. 164 (Mo. 1822).
82. Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
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century. Somewhat differently, Pennsylvania's Judge John Gibson
famously singled out Marbury for special criticism in his opinion in Eakin
v. Raub (1825), contending that "although the right in question ["to declare
all unconstitutional acts void"] has long been claimed by the judiciary, no
judge has ventured to discuss it, except Chief Justice Marshall." 83 Gibson's
idiosyncratic dissent had little influence with his contemporaries until it
was recovered and given new attention and status by James Bradley Thayer
and other scholars concerned with Marbury and the history of judicial
84
review at the turn of the twentieth century. Even these ambiguous
statements of Marbury's significance were highly unusual in the nineteenth
century judiciary. These three references were very much the exceptions to
the more common pattern noted above, and collectively they were hardly
clear in indicating a belief that John Marshall had created or established a
power of judicial review.
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Figure 5: Number of Federal and State Cases Citing Early Federal Judicial Review Cases,
1789 1900.
83. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
84. CLINTON, supra note 10, at 128.
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Figure 6: Number of Federal and State Cases Quoting from Marbury v. Madison, 1803-
2000. Note: Includes all state and federal cases quoting from select lines of the Marbury
opinion from 1803-2000, found using Westlaw. "Duty of Judicial Department" category
includes cases quoting from "emphatically the duty and province of the judicial department
to say what the law is." "Paramount Law" category includes cases quoting from
"constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is
on a level with ordinary legislative acts." "Limited Power" category is a composite
including cases quoting from any of the following: "giving to the legislature a practical and
real omnipotence"; "the powers of the legislature are defined, and limited"; "distinction,
between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished"; "to what purpose
are powers limited."
Marbury was an oft-cited example of the judicial review power, but it
had not been generally elevated by nineteenth-century judges to canonical
status as the wellspring of the power of judicial review. Figures 5 and 6
shed additional light on the process by which Marbury gained new
significance in the courts. Figure 5 traces the fate of some of the
competing candidates for canonization as the preferred cite for the power of
judicial review. The figure includes all citations in state and federal courts
to several federal cases that were commonly included in early string cites
on the power for judicial review, including Hylton,5  Vanhorne 's,86
Hayburn's,87 Calder," and Marbury. The early importance of Marbury as
"the mandamus case" gave it a salience and staying power that carried it
85. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796).
86. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795).
87. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792).
88. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
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through the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, other cases that had been
routinely paired with Marbury or that had overshadowed Marbury as
authorities for the power of judicial review were less cited for other points
of law and gradually dropped from judicial opinions as leading precedents
for the power of courts to nullify unconstitutional laws. No single state
case ever achieved the same universality of reference as the federal cases,
and extrajudicial sources passed in and out of favor over time.
Part of the explanation for the rise of Marbury appears to be its
quotability. As string cites on the authority of courts to exercise the power
of judicial review declined, favored quotes from Marbury replaced them.
Here too, however, Marshall proved to be a man for all seasons. As Figure
6 illustrates, judges up until the New Deal favored Marshall's bold
language on unchanging constitutional limits on legislative power. This
was the John Marshall featured in In re Jacobs (1885), the landmark New
York labor regulation case that helped launch the Lochner era.89 Judges
have in recent decades overwhelmingly followed Cooper in favoring
Marshall's sentence on the judicial authority to say what the law is. A
post-1980s resurgence in Marshallian language on constitutional limitations
is visible in Figure 6 as well, reflecting renewed interest by the courts in the
possibility of enforcing enumerated powers. Marshall's line about the
Constitution being a "superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means" sits comfortably with an emphasis on both constitutional limits and
judicial supremacy, and it has been a less prominent but steady presence in
judicial opinions since the Lochner era.
The treatise literature of the nineteenth century dealt with Marbury in
a comparable manner.90 A review of the major works of the period reveals
that Marbury was not generally treated with the special reverence that it
gets in the twentieth century. In his influential digest of all federal court
decisions, Richard Peters included twenty-four numbered paragraphs on
"general principles" relating to the constitutionality of statutes and judicial
review.91 Peters led the discussion with excerpts from Vanhorne's Lessee,
and he drew only three of those paragraphs from Marbury. Likewise,
Nathan Dane's earlier digest of American law included Marbury in a string
cite on the judicial duty to declare unconstitutional statutes void.9 2 By
contrast, in his digest limited to Supreme Court decisions, Justice Benjamin
89. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
90. Douglas, supra note 30; CLINTON, supra note 10.
91. RICHARD PETERS, 2 DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
618-19 (1860).
92. NATHAN DANE, 6 A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 614 (2d
ed., Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1824).
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Curtis simply cited Marbury for the first proposition under his
constitutional law heading: "An act of congress repugnant to the
constitution is not law."93
Early constitutional commentaries were matter-of-fact about the
judicial authority to interpret the Constitution and set aside unconstitutional
statutory requirements. Marbury was not generally identified as playing a
pivotal or foundational role in the creation or development of the power of
judicial review in the major treatises of the first decades of the nineteenth
century (with two significant exceptions to be discussed below). Henry St.
George Tucker observed that the "power to pronounce a law
unconstitutional has been ably and successfully maintained on some
memorable occasions," and listed several examples. However, he provided
an extended quote from Marbury, explaining in "that case the argument is
condensed by Judge Marshall with his usual force."94 In the second
published edition of his constitutional law lectures at Columbia, William
Duer added an extended footnote with precedents for courts declaring acts
of legislatures "void as against the Constitution."95 He did not include
Marbury in his list, and the authority that he chose to discuss in the body of
his original lecture was Federalist No. 78. William Rawle discussed,
without particular reliance on authority, the judicial power to enforce the
Constitution as one of the checks on legislative power.96  John Norton
Pomeroy defended the role of the judiciary as the "final arbiter as to the
meaning of the Constitution," but did not rely on specific precedents to
make the point. "In fact, the whole history of the Supreme Court is an
authority." For "important and leading cases," in which the issue was
examined with "a cogency of argument which never has been, and never
can be, answered," Pomeroy pointed the reader to several opinions, not
including Marbury.97 Thomas Cooley feared "wearying the patience of the
reader in quoting from the very numerous authorities upon the subject,"
and pointed the reader to a number of judicial and extrajudicial sources,
including Marbury, but provided in that text an extended quotation from a
93. BENJAMIN R. CURTIS, DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 101 (1856).
94. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 14 (1831).
95. WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (2d ed., Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1856).
96. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
277 (1825).
97. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 95 (1868).
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speech by Daniel Webster.98 Rawle and other treatise writers did take note
of the substantive significance of Marbury as a statement about the
constitutional jurisdiction of the courts and the mandamus power.99
Published obituaries and eulogies at the time of Marshall's death
largely avoided detailed discussions of his work on the Court or references
to individual cases, but they did not portray Marbury as among his
significant accomplishments or the power of judicial review as an unsettled
question at the time of his ascension to the Court. Horace Binney's (1835)
eulogy may have been the most popular, and it alludes to a variety of
important decisions that settled disputed constitutional questions and that
were "not to be shaken so long as the law has any portion of our regard."100
Marbury was not among them. Binney did not suggest that judicial review
was an open question when Marshall assumed the position of chief justice,
or that establishing the power of judicial review was among his
accomplishments. Instead, Binney more modestly observes that at the time
of Marshall's appointment "in many parts of the greatest difficulty and
delicacy, [the Constitution] had not then received a judicial
interpretation."' 0  The judicial "rules of interpretation were still to be
settled, and the meaning of its doubtful clauses to be fixed."l0 2 Similarly,
in his eulogy for Marshall, James Bryant took for granted that it was the
"prerogative and duty" of the Court to "test" statutes against the
requirements of the Constitution.1 03 The praise owed to Marshall was not
in creating or establishing such a power but in how he exercised the
responsibility with which he had been entrusted. Marbury was observed
98. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 45-6 (3d ed.,
1874). The relative insignificance of Marbury to Cooley can be seen in his comparable and more
extensive discussion of the power judicial review of statutes in a later treatise. In his General
Principles of Constitutional Law, Cooley illustrated his discussion with numerous cites to judicial
decisions, primarily by state courts, but did not cite or mention Marbury at all. THOMAS M.
COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144-55 (1880). Marbury was treated
as a case about judicial oversight of the executive. Id. at 157. Henry Wade Rogers, dean of the
Michigan Law School, later made the point even more explicit, when introducing a set of lectures
by Cooley and others: "Before the Federal Constitution was framed the constitutions of the
several States had established supreme courts within their States, and those courts exercised the
power of declaring legislative acts void, when in conflict with their respective constitutions,
before ever the Supreme Court of the United States asserted a similar power in 1803, in the great
case of Marbury v. Madison." Henry Wade Rogers, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES AS SEEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW 10 (1889).
99. Rawle, supra note 96, at 216.
100. HORACE BINNEY, AN EULOGY ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF JOHN MARSHALL 61
(1835).
101. Id. at 57.
102. Id. at 64.
103. JAMES R.M. BRYANT, EULOGIUM ON CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL 12 (1835).
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only for the purposes of illuminating Marshall's self-restraint, in "refusing
to exercise a prerogative" granted to him by Congress but unauthorized by
the Constitution.10 4
James Kent and Joseph Story were two notable exceptions in laying
the groundwork for the canonization of Marbury. Personal friends and
ideological allies, they both wrote highly influential treatises that appeared
near the end of Marshall's tenure on the Court, whom they held in great
admiration. In his Commentaries on American Law, Kent provides a
lengthy discourse on judicial review. Not only did the "courts of justice
have a right, and are in duty bound, to bring every law to the test of the
constitution" but the "judicial department is the proper power in the
government to determine whether the statute be or be not constitutional."' 0
Only by exercising "the exalted duty of expounding the constitution, and
trying the validity of statutes by that standard" will the courts be able to
protect the people from "undue and destructive innovations upon their
chartered rights." 0 6 Kent thought this to be "a settled principle in the legal
polity of this country," and he traced its "progress" from The Federalist
Papers through judicial decisions in the federal circuit and state courts. 0 7
His narrative culminates in Marbury. Until 1803, "this question . .. was
confined to one or two of the state courts, and to the subordinate, or circuit
courts of the United States." Only in Marbury did the question receive
"clear and elaborate discussion" by the "Supreme Court of the United
States" and only then was the power "declared in an argument approaching
to the precision and certainty of a mathematical demonstration." After that,
Kent concluded, the "great question may be regarded as now finally
settled." 08 Kent importantly introduces the notion that Marbury "settled"
the question of judicial review. Kent does not, however, give any
indication that the power of judicial review was particularly contested prior
to Marbury or that John Marshall exercised some creative force in
establishing it. His key point of contrast is between "the English
government" and "this country," and the primary virtue attributed to
Marshall's opinion is to its "clear and elaborate discussion" of the
104. Id. at 13.
105. JAMEs KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 421 (1826).
106. Id. at 422.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 424. Theodore Sedgwick repeats the Kent narrative in his treatise on interpretation,
concluding that, [flinally, the whole subject was elaborately examined and discussed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and the principle deliberately and definitively settled."
THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479 (1857).
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important subject.'09 Kent concludes his discussion of the power of judicial
review by emphasizing that there had never been "any doubt or difficulty in
this state, in respect to the competency of the courts to declare a statute
unconstitutional.""l0 Kent did not indicate whether there had ever been
"any doubt or difficulty" in any other state.
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story took a similar
view of the judicial power. "The universal sense of America has decided,
that in the last resort the judiciary must decide upon the constitutionality of
the acts and laws of the general and state governments.""' By firmly and
independently doing so, the courts could "subdue the oppression of the
other branches of the government."ll 2 To support his point, Story offered
extended excerpts from Federalist No. 78 and Marbury, observing that the
"reasoning of the Supreme Court.. . on this subject is so clear and
convincing, that it is deemed advisable to cite it in this place, as a
corrective to those loose and extraordinary doctrines, which sometimes find
their way into opinions possessing official influence."" 3 Even more than
Kent, Story was writing with the Jacksonians, and specifically the threat of
state nullification in mind. Neither Kent nor Story was content to merely
observe the existence of the power of judicial review; they wanted to
celebrate it and emphasize it. For Kent, the power was crucial to
"constitutional liberty, and ... the security of property in this country," and
thus worth an extended discussion.1 4  For Story, the authority of the
Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution was under threat from other
institutions, and so the basis of judicial review needed reinforcement to
combat those "extraordinary doctrines." As a justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court writing specifically on the U.S. Constitution, Story was perhaps more
inclined to quote from his friend John Marshall's opinion in Marbury, and
to leave out references to state cases of the sort that Chancellor Kent
included in his more general treatise.
Some legislators in the Civil War era went even further in suggesting
that Marbury was a special case in the history of judicial review, but they
did not always seek to praise the work that Marshall had done. Fueled by
lingering concerns over Dred Scott and the constitutionality of war and
Reconstruction measures, Republican Charles Drake used his brief time in
the U.S. Senate to propose eliminating the power of judicial review. He
109. Kent, supra note 105, at 420, 422, 424.
110. Kent, supra note 105, at 425.
111. Story, supra note 61, at 429.
112. Story, supra note 61, at 434.
113. Story, supra note 61, at 431.
114. Kent, supra note 105, at 425.
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singled out Marbury as the "leading case" that gave "authoritative
exposition of the grounds upon which the dogma rests."' 15 This "judicial
claim ... rests wholly upon an interpretation of its own power by the
judiciary, coupled with the unobjecting silence of the legislative
department." Given the insignificance of the statutory provision at issue,
Congress had slept during "this first attempt by the judiciary to disregard
its laws," allowing the practice to take hold.1 6 Drake was an anti-judicial
review gadfly, and he had good reason to minimize the Court's authority to
exercise the power of judicial review. He anticipated later Progressive
critics of the Court in singling out Marbury as unique and as the
illegitimate wellspring of the power of judicial review. But he was not
completely alone among congressmen in highlighting Marbury. In the
previous Congress, Democratic Representative James Beck had pointed to
Marbury as the case in which "the Supreme Court had defined its own
powers and announced what its duties, privileges, and rights are whenever
Congress attempts to pass any unconstitutional act," and had read an
extended excerpt from Marshall's opinion as part of his warning that a
Reconstruction measure was unconstitutional.1 7 Unlike Drake, Beck had
no objection to the Court playing its role, but he agreed with Drake in
characterizing Marbury as the source of its power.118 Such claims for the
uniqueness or foundational quality of Marbury were still not common
among legislators during the period, but it is striking that they had begun to
emerge at all.
In the late nineteenth century, the significance of Marbury in
establishing the power of judicial review became a prominent theme. As
the power of judicial review became more salient and more contested in the
second half of the century, commentators began to suggest that the question
of whether the courts had such a power had once been open but had been
115. CONG. GLOBE 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1870).
116. Id.
117. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 546 (1868). Unionist Senator Garrett Davis
provided a somewhat more conventional formulation to the same effect when observing that the
"great constitutional principle, that an act of Congress in conflict with the Constitution must yield
to it, and is of no validity whatever, was first enunciated by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Marshall being the organ, in the case of Marbury vs. Madison ... since which it has never been
questioned." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 935 (1866).
118. By contrast, during the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson, Republican
Representative Ben Butler went so far as to deny that Marbury was even among the precedents
for judicial review in his bid to counter the claim that other branches could realistically question
the constitutionality of congressional statutes. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. Supp. 36
(1868).
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permanently closed by Marshall's decisive action.119  George van
Santvoord's popular Sketches of Lives of the Chief Justices was initially
published just before the Civil War, and was republished in a series of
highly successful new editions in the decades after. He praised Marbury as
"[o]ne of the most important of these cases of constitutional construction,
as it is the earliest in point of time," and as containing an argument that
"has ever since been regarded as the fundamental principle, the very sheet
anchor of the Constitution, namely, that it is the right and the duty of the
judicial department to determine the constitutionality of a legislative act."
Although van Santvoord admitted that "this principle had, indeed, been
asserted at an earlier period" by other judges, he offered what would
become an influential claim about the importance of Marbury. Van
Santvoord asserted that despite such cases as Dorrance, this principle of
judicial review "does not appear to have been considered by the
professional mind as settled."1 20 As evidence, he pointed to Justice Samuel
Chase to suggest that the power of judicial review was an open question in
1803. Chase had hedged in Calder v. Bull (1798), a case involving a
challenge to a state law under a state constitution, "[w]ithout giving an
opinion, at this time, whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide that any
law made by Congress is void, I am fully satisfied that this Court has no
jurisdiction to determine that any law of any State Legislature contrary to
any Constitution of such State is void."' 2' He had likewise said in a circuit
court opinion of Cooper v. Telfair that "all acts of the Legislature in direct
opposition to the provisions of the Constitution would be void; yet it still
remains a question where the power resides to declare them void"
(emphasis added by van Santvoord). Van Santvoord carefully neglected to
quote Chase's next sentence in that opinion, in which he observed that
although "there is no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon this
point" as of 1800 (the court reporter would later add a footnote taking
account of Marbury), the existence of the power of judicial review was
"expressly admitted by all this bar," had been individually ruled on by
Supreme Court justices sitting in circuit, and was not thought to be in doubt
by Chase himself. Chase agreed "in the general sentiment" of "the period,
when the existing constitution came into operation," that the judiciary
119. On challenges to the courts in the late nineteenth century, see generally WILLIAM G.
ROSS, A MUTED FURY (1994).
120. GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, SKETCHES OF THE LIVES AND JUDICIAL SERVICES OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICES 353 (1856). By contrast, the competing work of Henry Flanders made only the
more modest claim that Marbury was the "first case involving a constitutional question of any
importance." HENRY FLANDERS, 2 THE LIVES AND TIMES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES 437 (1858).
121. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
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could declare unconstitutional acts void. 12 2 Chase did not believe the
power of judicial review was an unsettled question in 1800; he simply
believed that there was not yet a Supreme Court opinion endorsing the
practice of declaring laws void. Nonetheless, van Santvoord leveraged
Chase's words in cases that had frequently been cited as authorities for the
power of judicial review to build up the importance of Marbury as "the first
authoritative exposition of the Court on the subject" and a "final decision"
that "put the question at rest then and for ever." 2 3 Van Santvoord's
biographical account of Marshall and his rendition of Marbury's
significance became a standard reference in the latter nineteenth century,
being cited and quoted on this proposition by publications ranging from the
Albany Law Journall24 to Appleton's Cyclopedia ofAmerican Biographyl2 5
to Edward Elliott's Biographical Story of the Constitution.12 6 This led
Hampton Carson in his official centennial history of the Court to
characterize Marbury as "subjecting, once and forever, all executive and
ministerial officers as well as Congress itself to the control of the Court."
The clarity and source of Marbury was now thought to take on
particular significance. Whereas earlier commentators had grouped a wide
range of sources as offering support for the power of courts to give binding
interpretations of constitutions and declare statutes void, Carson
characterized all earlier decisions as "slow, timid, and halting footsteps"
that would culminate in the authoritative pronouncement by John Marshall
in Marbury.128 The pioneering political scientist W.W. Willoughby took
note of earlier cases declaring laws unconstitutional, but argued that what
was important was that "in 1803 .. . the principle was first definitely and
clearly applied by the Supreme Court." 29 By becoming "involved in a
consideration of the fundamental question whether the constitution was to
be regarded as an absolute limit to the legislative power," Willoughby
suggested, the Court was able decide the issue "if possible, once for all"
and having set it forth the power "has never been seriously questioned
since." 3 0 Other textbooks did the same. Take for example that of Clark
122. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14, 19 (1800).
123. Santvoord, supra note 120, at 354.
124. Isaac Thomas, John Marshall, 13 ALBANY L.J. 439, 443 (1876).
125. John Marshall, 4 APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 224 (James
Grant Wilson & John Fiske, eds. 1888).
126. EDWARD C. ELLIOTT, BIOGRAPHICAL STORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 130-33 (1910).
127. HAMPTON L. CARSON, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 9 (1891).
128. Id. at 180.
129. W.W. WILLOUGHBY, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 39 (1890).
130. Id. at 40.
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Hare, which called Marbury "noteworthy not only for the point directly
involved, but as having authoritatively established that the judicial branch
of the United States is paramount, and may virtually annul every act or
ordinance."l 3 1 As casebooks became the dominant pedagogical tool for
legal training at the turn of the twentieth century, Marbury entered the
teaching canon.'3 2  Other cases receded in significance or disappeared
altogether.'3 3
By the end of the nineteenth century, celebrations of John Marshall's
contribution to judicial review in Marbury were in full swing. Chief
Justice Waite added to the myth of Marbury with his address during the
unveiling of the statue of John Marshall on the fiftieth anniversary of his
death. According to Waite, by the time of Marshall's ascension to the
bench, "nothing had been done judicially to define the powers or develop
the resources of the Constitution." 34 Waite simply stated that the Supreme
Court announced "for the first time" in Marbury that "it was the duty of the
judiciary to declare an act of the legislative department of the Government
invalid if clearly repugnant to the Constitution.""' This was the only
decision of Marshall's that Waite singled out in his speech, and it was also
singled out in similar terms by representatives of the Philadelphia bar who
helped fund the statue. The British commentator James Bryce singled out
Marbury as the "famous judgment" that "laid down" the doctrine that
courts gave binding interpretations of the Constitution.136
By the end of the Gilded Age, the authority of courts to control
legislatures was increasingly contested but was also being held up as
essential to the constitutional enterprise. Marbury became the symbol of
this feature of American constitutionalism. Other features of Marbury that
had made the case of great importance to judges and lawyers earlier in the
nineteenth century were deemphasized. Marbury was repositioned as a
case centrally about judicial review, which in turn was regarded as essential
to "constitutional liberty" and "security of property," as Kent had argued a
half century before.' 37  Henry Hitchcock, a co-founder and eighteenth
president of the American Bar Association, declared that the "power of the
131. J.I. CLARK HARE, 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1169 (1889).
132. EMLIN MCCLAIN, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1900); JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1894).
133. CLINTON, supra note 10, at 164.
134. MORRISON R. WAITE, EXERCISES AT THE CEREMONY OF UNVEILING THE STATUE OF
JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1884).
135. Id. at 19-20.
136. JAMES BRYCE, 1 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 366 (1888).
137. Kent, supra note 105, at 454.
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court to declare void an Act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution"
was "determined" and "establish[ed]" in Marbury. Hitchcock took note of
the fact that others had tended to dwell on the "immense importance" of the
decision for subjecting executive branch officers "to the control of the
courts," but he believed that it was Marshall's "demonstration" of the
power of courts to void legislation that "lies at the very root of our system
of government." Hitchcock's emphasis on the importance of judicial
review was echoed by others at the turn of the century. Justice David
Brewer told the New York Bar Association that the "salvation of the
nation" depended on the "independence and vigor of the judiciary" that
would not "yield to the pressure of numbers, that so-called demand of the
majority."139 Similarly, Justice Stephen Field warned during the centennial
celebration of the Supreme Court that only with the support of the people
and the bar could the judges be expected to act with necessary
"fearlessness" and guard against "unrestrained legislative will ... [and]
arbitrary power." 4 0  In his presidential address to the American Bar
Association, John F. Dillon warned his colleagues of the "despotism of the
many-of the majority" and called on them to "defend, protect and
preserve" the constitutional provisions and the power of judicial review
that had been put in place as "the only breakwater against the haste and the
passions of the people."' ' It was Dillon who organized a national
celebration of "Marshall Day" in honor of the appointment of the great
chief justice, and who helped mobilize the memory of John Marshall and
the canonization of Marbury as supports for the maintenance and exercise
of judicial review at the turn of the twentieth century.14 2
Ironically, the supporters of judicial review at the end of the
nineteenth century preferred to rest their case on the historical reputation of
a single individual-John Marshall-and in doing so downplayed the other
authorities for judicial review that predated the mandamus case. Where
earlier judges and commentators, like Justice Chase, had tended to
138. Henry Hitchcock, Constitutional Development in the United States as Influenced by
Chief-Justice Marshall, in CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AS SEEN IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW 77 (1889).
139. DAVID J. BREWER, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING 47 (1893).
140. Stephen J. Field, The Centenary of the Supreme Court of the United States, 24 AM. L.
REV. 351, 359 (1890).
141. JOHN F. DILLON, REPORT OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 206, 211 (1892).
142. See Douglas, supra note 30, at 398-403; MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT
WOULD Go OF ITSELF 209-11 (1987); CLINTON, supra note 10, at 182-83.
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emphasize the "general sentiment"1 4 3 of the period as expressed in
extrajudicial sources, state cases, federal circuit court cases, and Supreme
Court cases, late-nineteenth century commentators and judges tended to
give exclusive emphasis to Marbury as an authoritative statement on the
power of the courts to enforce constitutional limits on legislatures. On one
hand, this focused attention on the "clear" and "forcible" 144 language of
John Marshall and on the prestige of the author and institution, and traded
on the already established importance of Marbury as a case about executive
power and court jurisdiction. On the other hand, this emphasis opened up
the argument to the vulnerability that Marshall might have usurped
authority and invented the power of judicial review out of whole cloth at
the late date of 1803. Regardless, both sides of the Progressive era debates
agreed on Marbury's importance to the doctrine of judicial review, and
variations of the claim that Chief Justice John Marshall and the Supreme
Court had done something special in 1803 to establish a power of judicial
review were common by the early twentieth century in a way that they had
not been through most of the nineteenth century.
Conclusion
Marbury is now firmly entrenched in the constitutional canon, and it
stands most preeminently for the power of courts to authoritatively
interpret constitutions and nullify laws that they believe violate
constitutional requirements. The U.S. Supreme Court itself now readily
points to Marbury as "establish[ing] beyond question" the power of judicial
review.145 Nothing is more basic to modem cultural literacy about
American constitutionalism than to attribute the creation of the power of
judicial review to John Marshall and Marbury v. Madison.
This construction of Marbury is of modem origin. Marbury became
the flashpoint for debates over the legitimacy of judicial review of
legislation during the Lochner era. Revisionist scholarship on Marbury has
suggested that the case was not that important to establishing judicial
review in the early republic and that it was not seen as an especially
significant case in the early republic. This Article replicates and extends
the existing work on the reception and use of Marbury, shedding light on
its meaning over time, and on the process of constitutional canonization
and the transmission and transformation of precedents.
143. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14, 19 (1800).
144. Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15 (Iowa 1849).
145. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995).
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Our findings reinforce and modify the lessons of the existing literature
on Marbury and on the theory of the constitutional canon. Our extended
citation analysis from federal and state courts and legislative and executive
documents, along with our qualitative analysis of judicial opinions and
legal commentators support the view that Marbury did not carry the
meaning and significance relative to the power of judicial review in the
early nineteenth century that it carries now. At the same time, we believe
earlier scholars have gone too far in concluding that Marbury was of little
significance in the nineteenth century. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
rarely cited the case in support of its authority to exercise the power of
judicial review in its opinions before the twentieth century, it routinely
cited Marbury for other purposes. Other courts and commentators likewise
recognized Marbury as being a "great case" from early in the nineteenth
century because of its substantive statements about the constitutional
jurisdiction of courts and the judicial authority to oversee the executive
branch. As a high-profile case standing firmly for the view that the
American constitutional system was one of "a government of laws, and not
of men," it was a short step to borrow its authority when judicial review of
legislation became more salient in the late nineteenth century.14 6
Moreover, Marbury was routinely included as part of a set of authorities
that were cited to support or demonstrate the power of judicial review in
the nineteenth century. Marbury was a prime candidate for canonization.
Early commentators varied in whether they treated Marbury as a
notable case relative to judicial review. Some ignored it entirely. Others
highlighted it. Most simply included it in a long list of relevant authorities
on the subject. What distinguishes most early discussions of Marbury and
judicial review from later discussions is context and significance. Early
commentators recognized Marbury as one of many authorities on the
subject, and (for the most part) they gave no particular pride of place to
Marbury and did not attribute any causal significance for constitutional
development relative to judicial review to the Marshall Court's decision in
the case. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, Marbury was
increasingly allowed to stand on its own as an authority for the power of
judicial review and commentators were increasingly attributing special
significance to Marshall's opinion. It was no longer merely a quotable
summary of a common sentiment of the founding era. Through force of
reasoning and will, Marbury v. Madison is now thought to have somehow
decisively settled an open question. Most lawyers and judges in the
nineteenth century knew better. But the heroic vision of Chief Justice John
146. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
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Marshall and his opinion in Marbury as active forces in American
constitutional history were promulgated by particularly influential
advocates in the form of Joseph Story, James Kent, and George van
Santvoord. Marshall had the benefit of great publicists.
